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Book Review
Colin Dayan, The Law Is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. 368, $29.95.
Reviewed by Dean Spade
Who gets banned and expelled so that we can live in reasonable consensus? 
Let us name them now. Criminals. Security Threats. Terrorists. Enemy 
Aliens. Illegal Immigrants. Migrant Contaminants. Unlawful Enemy Alien 
Combatants. Ghost Detainees. These are new orders of life; they hover 
outside the bounds of the civil, beyond the simple dichotomies of reason 
and unreason, legal and illegal. The receptacles for these outcasts are in the 
wilderness, the desert, or islands cut off from sociocultural networks of daily 
life....[T]his ongoing global cultivation of human waste, brazen in its display, 
makes our sense of inclusion a rare and precarious privilege (22).
In The Law is a White Dog, Colin Dayan explores relationships between what 
are often considered separate and distinct areas and eras of legal history 
and substance, exposing important connections. Her aim is to trace the 
development and transformation of various hierarchical statuses of personhood 
in American law. To do so, she explores slave law, torture, 8th Amendment cases 
about conditions of confinement in prisons, civil law consequences in criminal 
punishment, and the legal statuses of dogs. Dayan artfully navigates historical 
and contemporary developments in contract, tort, property, constitutional, 
trusts and estates, and criminal law concerning people and animals that have 
been afforded complex and shifting statuses and capacities in law—those 
considered people and property, or a strange and hybrid form of property, or 
determined to lack legally recognizable mental capacities sufficient for civil 
action.
Dayan’s method is evocative and departs from conventions of scholarly 
legal writing in ways that are richly productive for her inquiry. The book does 
not proceed through time or topic in a linear fashion, but rather offers textured 
and historically contextualized examinations of particular cases and law 
enforcement practices, and then returns to them after excavating phenomena 
that first can appear distinct but that she ultimately shows to be connected 
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and illuminating.1 The result is a provocative and rigorous analysis that 
makes a significant contribution both to legal scholarship and contemporary 
discussions about criminalization, national security, and racism.
The book examines how hierarchies of personhood are produced through 
the interaction of civil and criminal law, and asserts that domination, 
specifically racial domination in the U.S., requires the production of legal 
fictions to justify and rationalize the cruelty that has been an ongoing feature of 
American law and law enforcement from the first days of colonization through 
slavery and Jim Crow and continuing today in mass racialized imprisonment 
and “War on Terror” detention and interrogation practices. Employing a 
novel approach to questions of legal personhood, Dayan interrogates some 
key narratives of progress cherished in American law and popular culture: a 
narrative that the law has progressed toward rational, secular and scientific 
treatment away from mystical, religious and arbitrary pre-enlightenment 
approaches; a narrative that slavery was abolished in the U.S. and that law 
established a path to legal equality and full personhood for black people; 
a narrative that criminal punishment has progressed away from cruelty and 
toward rational and scientific guarantees of humane treatment. The Law is a 
White Dog offers novel insights to ongoing critical intellectual trajectories that 
have interrogated these progress narratives, innovating on the methodology 
of critical race studies and blending rigorous historical research that brings 
the broader context of important cases and other legal developments to light.
One example of this is Dayan’s discussion of the 13th Amendment. In the 
last decade, scholars and anti-prison activists have increasingly articulated the 
argument made popular by Angela Davis’ 2003 book, Are Prisons Obsolete?, that 
focuses on the 13th Amendment’s qualification on the abolition of slavery, 
“except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted.” Davis argues that this caveat served to transition the methods of 
control and violence targeted at black people under slavery into a new form: 
a racially targeted and quickly expanding criminal punishment system. Davis 
specifically traces how criminal punishment shifted after the formal abolition 
of slavery. Prisons suddenly expanded and were filled with black people, 
“Black codes” criminalized statuses like unemployment and vagrancy for black 
people only, methods of punishment popular in slavery like whipping were 
introduced in prisons, and convict leasing emerged to repopulate plantations 
with enslaved black workers.2 Davis’ examination of the transition of anti-
black violence and forced labor from slavery to criminalization is central 
to her analysis of the contemporary U.S. prison system which continues to 
target black people and, to a lesser degree but still significantly, other people 
of color. Davis effectively exposes the connection between these forms of 
1. Dayan aims to “dramatiz[e] a perplexing legal history too often lost in linearity, [and]. . . 
preserv[e] a discontinuous but thematically linked approach.” As a result, she successfully 
reveals a relationship between past and present that undermines progress narratives that 
remain central to political and legal discourse in the U.S.(xiii). 
2. Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? 29 (Seven Stories Press 2003).
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racialized control and violence and argues that the U.S.’s world leadership 
in imprisonment (we are the most imprisoning country in the world, with 5 
percent of the world’s population and 25 percent of its prisoners) is a feature 
of the country’s fundamental white supremacy. As such, she argues that 
imprisonment is not an effective or legitimate approach to the range of social 
problems (drug use, violence against women and children, poverty-related 
property crime) that contemporary prison expansion efforts claim to address.
Dayan examines the 13th Amendment and provides further historical 
context to deepen this important inquiry. She looks at how the fiction of “civil 
death” for felons became more prominent in the U.S. after the legal elimination 
of slavery, and was used to remake the personhood of the criminal (a class 
of persons suddenly centrally racialized as black) in the image of the slave. 
She argues that the 13th Amendment, “too often obscured by attention to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is essential to understanding how the burdens and 
disabilities that constituted the badges of slavery took powerful hold on the 
language of penal compulsion” (64). She writes, “’the badges and incidents 
of slavery’ continued to exist under the cover of civil death. This legal fiction 
and the criminal ethnography it fostered miraculously remade persons. . . . 
[C]riminals were punished with the degradation that had once been the lot of 
slaves, especially if the criminals were former slaves or descendants of slaves” 
(58). The 13th Amendment “marked the discursive link between the civilly 
dead felon and the slave or social nonperson. Criminality was racialized and 
race criminalized.” (64). Dayan describes how during the second session of 
the 39th Congress, Senator Charles Sumner raised significant concerns about 
the 13th Amendment’s important caveat. He presented a notice from Arundel 
County, Maryland listing the public sale of “a negro man named Richard 
Harris for six months, convicted…for larceny, and sentenced by the court to 
be sold as a slave” (62).3 Other evidence that black people were being sold as 
slaves as punishment for crimes was also presented (62). 
Dayan connects her exploration of the medieval sanction of “civil death” 
to slave law and contemporary criminal punishment regimes in several ways 
that are useful to contemporary debates about race and criminalization. The 
popularity of Michelle Alexander’s recent book, The New Jim Crow, has brought 
increased attention to these questions and further highlighted the analysis 
that Angela Davis,4 Ruth Gilmore,5 Dylan Rodriguez6 and other prominent 
3. Citing Alfred Avins, The Reconstruction Amendments’ Debates 258 (Comm’n on the 
Const. Gov’t, U.S. Cong., 1967). 
4. See Davis, supra note 2; see also Davis, Abolition Democracy: Beyond Empire, Prisons, and 
Torture (Seven Stories Press 2005).
5. See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition 
in Globalizing California (Univ. of Calif. Press 2007); see also, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, 
Globalisation and US Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to Post Keynesian 
Militarism, 40 Race & Class 171 (1999).
6. See Dylan Rodriguez, Forced Passages: Imprisoned Radical Intellectuals and the U.S. 
Prison Regime (Univ. of Minn. Press 2006); see also Rodríguez, The Political Logic of the 
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scholars, along with grassroots organizations like Critical Resistance,7 
INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence8 and GenerationFIVE,9 have 
been cultivating in scholarly and community discussions especially in the last 
decade. Dayan’s analysis of the 13th Amendment’s role in shifting racialized 
labor exploitation, control and violence from a chattel slavery system to a 
system of criminalization is achieved through a novel analysis of the complex 
fictions of legal personhood required to produce ongoing racial domination 
in American law. She links “civil death” to the contemporary practice of felony 
disenfranchisement, which Human Rights Watch predicts will result in 40 
percent of African American men being permanently disenfranchised in states 
with the most restrictive voting laws. Already, 13 percent of African American 
adult men, a total of 1.4 million, are disenfranchised, and African American 
men constitute 36 percent of the total disenfranchised population (60).10 
Dayan quotes Justice J. Christian, in 1871, describing the convict as the “slave 
of the state” in his elaboration on the extinction of civil rights of felons (61).11 
If convicted felons are something less than full legal persons, what are they, 
and how is their personhood like and unlike the less-than-full personhood of 
slaves?
Slaves, Dayan points out, were prevented from civil personhood under 
American slave law, but could be liable for criminal acts. To explore this, 
she examines Bailey v. Poindexter’s Executor, an 1858 case concerning the will of 
a slave owner. John Lewis Poindexter’s will provided that some of his slaves 
should have “their choice of being emancipated [under certain conditions] 
or sold publicly” after his wife’s death (141). Poindexter may have willed 
this choice be given to the slaves because in the wake of the 1782 Virginia 
Manumission Act, slaves had to leave the state within a year of emancipation 
or be re-enslaved. Possibly, Poindexter wanted his slaves to have the choice 
of whether to be exiled from their home or be able to remain in Virginia 
(143). The court ultimately determined that Poindexter’s wishes could not be 
adhered to, because slaves could not engage in a civil act of choosing that 
would be recognized by law. Dayan explains that given the national tensions 
Non-Profit Industrial Complex in The Revolution Will Not be Funded (South End Press 
2009).
7. See http://criticalresistance.org/about/.
8. See Critical Resistance and INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, Gender Violence 
and the Prison-Industrial Complex, available at http://www.incite-national.org/media/
docs/5848_incite-cr-statement.pdf. 
9. GenerationFIVE, Towards Transformative Justice: Why a Liberatory Response to Violence 
Is Necessary for a Just World, (RESIST Somerville, MA) Sept./Oct. 2008, available at 
http://www.resistinc.org/newsletters/articles/towards-transformative-justice.
10. Citing Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony 
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, Human Rights Watch and the Sentencing 
Project (1998) cited in Alec Ewald, ‘Civil Death’: the Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 5 Wis. L. Rev. 1045,1132 (2002).
11. Citing Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790 (1871).
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over slavery emerging at the time, following such events as passage of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the caning of Charles Sumner in the Senate 
chamber for giving an anti-slavery speech, and the murder of pro-slavery 
farmers by John Brown in Kansas in 1856, pro-slavery judges navigated complex 
legal framings and introduced important legal fictions to maintain racial 
domination (144). “Not simply things and not really humans, slaves occupied 
a curiously nuanced category. Examples ranging from proofs of animality to 
marks of reason or imbecility—and a great deal in between—became part and 
parcel of judicial work” (139). The majority in Bailey, like other pro-slavery 
judges, had to be careful not to ascribe total mental incapacity to slaves, since 
they were legally culpable for criminal activity (147).12 They had to create a 
legal personhood that was capable only of criminal acts, but would not be 
recognized as having a legal capacity for civil action. John Howard, a lawyer 
for the heirs in Bailey, argued that slaves had no will, that they were property 
and that their actions “are but the acts of the master if authorized and ratified 
by him: otherwise, they are of no legal validity” (149).13 According to Howard, 
because they had no legal mind, no ability to consent, decide or judge, slaves 
could not be parties to contracts. Howard argued that civilly alive persons 
possess “legal conscience, legal intellect, legal freedom, or liberty and power 
of free choice and action, and corresponding legal obligations growing out of 
such qualities”( 150).14 Slaves had to be articulated in law as people with no 
recognizable intelligence or mental capacity in order to maintain the capacity 
to enslave. In order to explain the fact that, as Howard conceded, “common 
observation teaches that our slaves, in some cases, have a very high degree of 
intellect and moral sense, . . . [and] a strong enough will of their own” (150),15 
yet were merely property that should be considered civilly dead, he compared 
slaves to “dogs, cattle, wild animals” (151)16 and other animate property that the 
law recognized as property even though they are different than “a package of 
goods” (152). Howard convinced the court that slaves occupied this complex 
position—property with person-like attributes, including the mental capacity 
to commit a crime and be held responsible, but civilly dead and unable to 
make a legal choice to be emancipated. If Poindexter had ordered his slaves 
freed in his will, his wishes would have been honored, but because he gave 
them a choice that they were determined to lack the capacity to make, his heirs 
prevailed and the enslaved people were sold.
Throughout the text, Dayan reveals how the assignment of legally recognized 
mental capacity or incapacity of the depersonalized persons she examines is 
12. Quoting Thomas Cobb, who wrote “An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the 
United States of America” (1858) six months after Bailey, stating “The theory of a complete 
annihilation of will in the slave is utterly inconsistent with all recognition of him as a person, 
especially as responsible criminally for his acts” (302).
13. Citing Bailey at 6.
14. Quoting Bailey at 7.
15. Quoting Bailey at 10.
16. Quoting Bailey at 9.
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used as evidence of their personhood. She looks at the “deliberate indifference” 
standard applied by the Supreme Court in cases where prisoners contest 
conditions of confinement. This standard focuses on the intent of the prison 
officials, rather than the injury experiences of prisoners, to determine whether 
cruelty has occurred.17 Dayan argues that this standard “denie[s] interiority” to 
prisoners who are the objects of harm (181). Their pain and suffering have no 
meaning. If a prison official can invent an administrative reason that they were 
subjected to conditions common in American prisons, such as rape, medical 
neglect, nutritional deprivation, and brutal physical assault, then the cruelty 
will not be recognized by courts. Dayan’s examination of this puzzling legal 
reasoning next to her discussion of the denial of mental interiority to slaves 
in Bailey and the reality that more than 40 percent of U.S. prison inmates are 
black men, presents a chilling picture of continued racialized hierarchies of 
personhood.18 She argues that the deliberate indifference standard is a site of 
clear distinction in degrees of personhood, “between those capable of intent 
and the presumed unthinking recipients of punishment” (191). 
Dayan’s discussion of supermax prisons, of solitary confinement, that 
“peculiarly American invention,” and of the torture of Guantanamo detainees, 
further illuminates these concerns about the legal fictions that legitimize 
and codify racialized violence (65). Dayan argues that prisoners’ rights 
jurisprudence has not, as might be hoped, reduced or eliminated inhumane 
prison conditions, but has instead helped various government actors to reframe 
their worst practices to fit within what is legally sanctioned. In order to avoid 
prisoners making due process claims that would require prison administrators 
to provide a rationale for putting people in solitary confinement, prison officials 
have renamed it “administrative segregation,” casting it as a matter of discretion 
for officials to use their expertise to determine (31, 78-79, 94).19 Attorneys in 
the Bush administration closely studied 8th Amendment jurisprudence to 
17. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) and Dayan at 186: “The full force of mental volition 
is transferred to the person of the prison official. The requirement that aggrieved prisoners 
show deliberate indifference by their keepers when claiming cruel and unusual punishment 
permits untoward rationalizations. This reasoning measures cruelty not by the pain and 
suffering inflicted but by the intent of the person who inflicts them.”
18. See Michelle Alexander: More Black Men Are In Prison Today Than Were Enslaved In 1850, 
Huffington Post, (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/12/
michelle-alexander-more-black-men-in-prison-slaves-1850_n_1007368.html. More than 60 
percent of US prisoners are black or Hispanic; see Albert R. Hunt, A Country of Inmates, 
N.Y. Times (Nov 20, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/us/21iht-letter21.
html?pagewanted=all.
19. Dayan discusses how determinations about placement in solitary confinement are both 
arbitrary and almost impossible to contest. Prisoners can be placed for reasons that are 
impossible to disprove such as for their own protection, based on accusations of gang 
membership, or for administrative convenience (79). Classifying it as “administrative 
segregation” rather than “solitary confinement” deprives prisoners of a due process demand, 
since the placement is not cast as additional punishment (94). She discusses in depth how 
harmful solitary confinement is for people subjected to it, a fact that has lead some to argue 
that it is actually a more severe punishment than death (85-6).
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formulate arguments justifying torture, in the process renaming it “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” (31). Dayan argues that the range of changes that 
have occurred in the period after the swell of prisoner rights advocacy a few 
decades ago cannot be cast as progress. She writes, 
It is as if with each court case, with each decision to make the prison more 
legal or to tailor its confines to constitutional expectations in the face of 
proliferating claims of cruel and unusual treatment, punishment became more 
refined and hidden, less vulgar and obvious. . . . Expertise and professionalism 
mask the harsh effects of idleness and deprivation, the preferred “treatment“ 
in these supermaxes (74).
The Law Is a White Dog places these contemporary practices in a longer history 
of the legal production of gradations of statuses of personhood, and of the 
construction of depersonalized persons, that have produced and sustained 
systemic racialized violence in the U.S. Dayan successfully demonstrates 
the complexities of the simultaneously lawless and hyper-legal violence 
of criminalization to which any lawyer working with highly policed and 
imprisoned populations in the U.S. today can attest. She argues that, “[i]t is 
not an absence of law but an abundance of it that allows government to engage 
in seemingly illegal practices” (72). The kinds of reasoning engaged in by the 
lawyers who wrote and signed the infamous “torture memos,” the judges who 
enforce the deliberate indifference standard to dismiss challenges to inhumane 
prison conditions and justify the warehousing of people in supermax facilities, 
and those who defended slavery overlap in their manipulation of concepts of 
mental capacity and incapacity, reference to images and ideas of animality, and 
invocation of racialized “dangerousness” to sustain state violence. Dayan’s 
innovative engagement with a range of legal areas and eras helps illuminate 
the continuity of phenomena consistently declared discontinuous. She argues 
that, “[t]he extremity of contemporary punishment in the United States—
practices (anomalous in the so-called civilized world) of state-sponsored 
execution, prolonged and indefinite solitary confinement, excessive force, 
and other kinds of psychological torture—can be traced back to the country’s 
colonial history of legal stigma and civil incapacity” (71). U.S. law and culture 
consistently proclaim a definitive historical break between the bad old days of 
slavery and Jim Crow, and the purportedly “post-racial” Obama era. People in 
the United States, and those around the world living in countries to which our 
law enforcement models are being exported, face the puzzling contradiction 
between this national progress narrative and the realities of rapid expansion 
of prison and immigration systems that target people of color—what could be 
understood as an overall expanding apparatus of racialized state violence.20 
20. According to the ACLU, “[f]rom 2001 to 2010, the number of immigrants held in 
immigration detention each year nearly doubled, from 209,000 immigrants per year in 
2001 to almost 392,000 in 2010.” ACLU, Securely Insecure: The Real Costs, Consequences 
& Human Face of Immigration Detention (January 2011), available at http://www.
detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/1.14.11_Fact%20
Sheet%20FINAL_0.pdf. The Obama Administration has deported more people than 
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Dayan’s research offers law reformers an opportunity to pause and consider 
the pitfalls of reform. In the case of prisoner’s rights, years of legal reform 
efforts seem to have led to larger numbers of people being imprisoned in 
more high-tech prisons and prisons legally rationalized as less cruel, while 
inhumane conditions remain the status quo. Prison expansion projects are 
consistently articulated by their proponents as beneficial to the people who 
will be imprisoned in the new facilities. In California, advocates of “gender 
responsive prisons” proposed a policy that would expand the women’s prison 
system in that state (already the largest women’s prison system in the world) 
by 40 percent, in the name of helping women and children.21 In Seattle in 
2012, a tax levy to raise $210 million dollars to tear down and rebuild the city’s 
youth jail (and, incidentally, sell off acres of land to private developers to 
build condominiums in a gentrifying historically black neighborhood) was 
pitched by proponents as a beneficial “youth and family justice center” and 
marketed through a now-defunct website called yeschildrenandfamilies.com.22 
In both these proposals, ever-growing systems of imprisonment are cast as 
inevitable and as reforms beneficial to those anticipated to be imprisoned. 
This logic of sustaining and increasing the largest imprisonment project in 
world history—the U.S. prison system—which many argue is motivated by 
profit-making opportunities available in a highly privatized system,23 is being 
contested by those who argue that imprisonment fails to increase safety and 
any other presidential administration in U.S. history, 1.5 million in his first term. Corey 
Dade, Obama Administration Deported Record 1.5 Million People, December 24, 2012, 
NPR, available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/12/24/167970002/obama-
administration-deported-record-1-5-million-people. The United States has the highest 
documented incarceration rate in the world. International Centre for Prison Studies, Prison 
Brief—Highest to Lowest Rates, World Prison Brief, King’s College London School of Law, 
March 18, 2010, available at http://www.webcitation.org/5xRCN8YmR. According to a recent 
report by the Congressional Research Service, the federal prison population has increased 
by nearly 790 percent since 1980. Nathan James, The Federal Prison Population Buildup: 
Overview, Policies, Issues, Changes and Options, Congressional Research Service, Jan, 
22, 2013, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. In 2011, approximately 
one in every 34 adults, or about seven million people, were in prison or under correctional 
control of some kind. Lauren Glaze, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2011, 
November 29, 2012, United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at http://bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4537.
21. Anti-prison feminist organizations, including Justice Now, A New Way of Life Reentry 
Project, and California Prison Moratorium Project organized to resist this policy. See 
Californians United for a Responsible Budget, How ‘Gender Responsive Prisons’ Harm 
Women, Children and Families, (May 2007) available at http://curbprisonspending.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/curb_report_v5_all_hi_res.pdf. 
22. The community group opposing the project continues to argue that the resources being 
devoted to the project would better support children and families if they were spent 
on income support, affordable housing, health care, child care and other necessities 
criminalized communities are lacking. See Why Oppose the New Youth Jail?, available at 
https://nonewyouthjail.wordpress.com/.
23. See Davis, supra note 2; see also Cuéntame, available at http://www.mycuentame.org/
immigrantsforsale.
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propose that it produces harm and violence rather than prevents or resolves 
it. In a successful 2008-2009 campaign to stop the building of a new adult jail 
in Seattle, advocates exposed that Washington state agencies use the reading 
scores of fourth graders to calculate projections about how many prison cells 
will be needed in the future.24 The reference to these nine-year-old students 
for whom the state is already preparing prison cells echoes Dayan’s concerns 
about criminalization and depersonalized persons.25 It is chilling to imagine 
bureaucrats sitting in government offices making these calculations, and 
perhaps more so to imagine advocates of prison expansion projects earnestly 
believing that their efforts will benefit the women or children for whom these 
cells are being built. Dayan’s work helps us trace the role legal reasoning has 
played in producing a slave society, and a prison society, in which structures 
of racial violence appear inevitable, justifiable, rational and natural, even to 
those who see themselves as reformers seeking justice. “When law is called 
upon to ascertain a ‘rational’ basis for sustaining the dominion of the dead 
and the ghostly, much depends on assumptions that most of us claim to find 
intolerable. But recent events continue to prove how much we can tolerate. 
How easy is it for fear, dogma and terror to allow us to demonize others, . . . to 
do unspeakable things to them. In a morally disenchanted world, daily cruelty 
and casual violence accompany the call for order” (32–33).
24. These figures were cited during a January 28, 2009 panel entitled “Question Inevitability: 
Does Seattle Need a New Jail?” that I participated in at Seattle University. They can be found 
published in Eric S. Hall & Zorka Karanxha, School Today, Jail Tomorrow: The Impact 
of Zero Tolerance on the Over-Representation of Minority Youth in the Juvenile System, 
Power Play 4(1), at 20 (2012) available at http://www.emich.edu/coe/powerplay/documents/
vol_04/no_01/ppj_vol_04_no_01_hall_karanxha.pdf, citing Henry A. Giroux, Youth in a 
Suspect Society: Democracy or Disposibility? (Palgrave Macmillan 2009).
25. She writes,
 
If more or less tangible objects can be either ‘property’ or ‘persons’ in the eyes of 
the law, what we consider subjects of legal rights and duties can also be stripped of 
these attributes. We are obliged to consider the creation of a species of depersonalized 
persons. Deprived of rights to due process, to bodily integrity, or life, these creatures 
remain persons in law. The reasoning necessary to this terrain of the undead sanctions 
the irrational: the reasonable extension of unspeakable treatment to an unknowable 
future (32).
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